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Abstract 
This paper reports the preliminary results of a study to explore the influence 
of transaction costs on Department of Defense (DoD) cost estimates.  It is an 
extension of previous work that established that Transaction Cost Economics has 
promising explanatory power in terms of costs of major DoD acquisition programs.  
The current work explores methods of measuring transaction costs as a first step in 
improving estimation methods by including explanatory variables that capture the 
coordination and motivation problems associated with a program.  The preliminary 
results indicate that it is possible to measure contractor Systems 
Engineering/Program Management (SEPM) costs as a proxy for transaction costs.  
The ratio of SEPM to total costs was examined for two case studies (Javelin and 
ATACMS) for which ex-ante indicators of transaction costs had been assessed.  The 
results are consistent in that the program with ex-ante indicators that indicated 
higher transaction costs also had a significantly higher SEPM ratio.  Further 
research is required to better establish the relationship between transaction costs 
indicators and the quality of DoD cost estimates.   
Keywords: Department of Defense (DoD) cost estimates, Transaction Cost 
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Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a well-developed field of study that 
arises from the fundamental insight that markets are not frictionless and costless.  A 
firm can be modeled as a network of contractual relationships (transactions) and one 
possible way to minimize transactions costs is the firm’s internal bureaucracy.  
Coase (1937) was among the first to note that since market transactions are costly 
to manage, “by forming an [internal support] organization and allowing some 
authority to direct resources, certain costs are saved” (p. 392).  However, vertical 
integration of transactions within the firm can have its own set of problems, such as 
internal opportunistic behavior (lobbying for higher budgets), multi-tasking (based on 
measurements), and sub-optimization.   
The nature of the transactions will determine the vertical boundaries of the 
firm and determine if a good or service is produced internally or externally.  The firm 
will buy (outsource) if the internal costs are greater than the outsourced costs.  A key 
insight from TCE is that firms should consider both the cost of production and the 
cost of transactions in evaluating “make-or-buy” decisions.  The internal costs 
include the production costs and the internal bureaucracy (“agency”) costs.  The 
outsourced costs include the production costs and the transaction costs.  TCE 
predicts that contracts and governance structures will be chosen so that transaction 
costs are reduced between buyer and seller.  Conflicting objectives, however, can 
lead to opportunistic behavior including the challenge of relation-specific investments 
(or “asset specificity”), which can increase the risk to both parties in the transaction.  
Other key characteristics of transactions are complexity, uncertainty, length of the 
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TCE Issues in Defense Acquisition  
TCE provides a framework to facilitate understanding and improvement within 
defense acquisitions.  When the Department of Defense (DoD) purchases a weapon 
system there are numerous transaction costs associated with source selection, 
periodic competition and renegotiation, contract negotiation and management, 
performance measuring and monitoring and dispute resolutions.  The costs are not 
unique to DoD transactions. They are only magnified by the size of the transactions 
involved. 
While outsourcing promises to lower production costs through competition 
and a reduction in internal “agency” costs, defense acquisitions rarely take place in a 
competitive market for a variety of reasons.  Often, relation-specific investments 
necessary to produce large or complex weapon systems create barriers to 
competition.  In addition, the acquisition process itself may limit competition by 
eliminating sellers: what starts as a competitive bid, can lead to a bilateral monopoly. 
Although some gains from competition may be captured up-front in the competitive 
bidding process, some of those gains are often recouped in latter stages by the ex-
post monopoly provider.  
Previous research has established that Transaction Cost Economics has 
promising explanatory power in developing costs estimates for major DoD 
acquisition projects (Melese, Franck, Angelis, & Dillard, 2007).  Coordination and 
motivation problems in commercial and contractual arrangements (such as acquiring 
major weapon systems) manifest themselves in some key indicators about the 
nature of the contractual relationship.  They are also in evidence during observable 
events through the life of the projects—in matters relating to cost and schedule, as 
well as governance of the relationship. 
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a) Search and Information Costs—to identify options and acquire timely, 
accurate and relevant information to evaluate alternatives; 
b) Bargaining and Decision Costs—to choose an alternative and 
negotiate and write a contract; and  
c) Policing and Enforcement Costs—to make payments and measure, 
monitor, and evaluate performance. 
Motivation Costs include: 
a) Costs to promote productive effort and incentives to encourage 
investment (better, faster, cheaper) and  
b) Costs to deter unproductive bargaining and opportunistic behavior 
(renegotiation).  
Factoring TCE cost considerations into cost-estimating efforts could help the 
DoD anticipate cost increases in four key areas that the GAO (1997) suggests will 
help explain cost overruns: 
a) Constantly changing missions (uncertain 
demand/quantity/characteristics, bilateral monopoly, asset specificity, 
holdup, incomplete contracting); 
b) Yearly incremental funding vs. multi-year appropriations (uncertainty, 
frequency, asset specificity, holdup); 
c) Incentive problems (incomplete contracting, asset specificity, holdup); 
and 
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Hypothesis 
Total costs are a function of production costs and transaction costs.  In 
acquisition, production costs are developed from a Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS): a production function mechanism that identifies the inputs and activities 
required to produce a specific weapon system.  While the WBS provides an 
excellent accounting system to develop production cost estimates, it is input-
oriented, not relationship-oriented.  It therefore largely overlooks transaction costs 
(including coordination and motivation costs). In turn, this contributes to overly 
optimistic cost estimates. (Melese et al., 2007) 
TCE theory suggests that coordination and motivation problems can lead to 
predictably higher costs when the program is completed.  Thus, we hypothesize that 
higher program costs are predictable from both the indicators available prior to 
project start and during the course of the project itself—especially the choice of 
governance mechanisms.  We also hypothesize that higher program costs observed 
during and after the acquisition project are ex-post indicators of hidden or 
unanticipated transaction costs.  The basic model for TCE variables being a 
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Figure 1.  TEC Issues in Acquisition Projects and Hypothesized Cost 
Manifestations 
Our basic hypothesis is that including TCE considerations (currently an 
omitted Variable in most calculations) can improve cost-estimation methodology by 
(a) helping to explain the systematic bias observed in initial cost estimates (Arena, 
2006) and (b) increasing the general explanatory power of cost estimations. That is, 
we observe that the traditional WBS approach may overlook some important 
variables, resulting in initial cost estimates that are (a) not accurate and (b) 
downward biased. More specifically, the TCE perspective suggests the traditional 
WBS approach indeed overlooks two important variables: Coordination Costs and 
Motivation Costs. Unlike the production function approach of WBS, the TCE 
approach focuses on these and other key components of major weapon system 
acquisitions. 
A key observation is that once production starts, the contractor acquires 
specialized information and assets. Production is often subject to economies of 
scale and learning curves that contribute to some natural monopoly power. The 
ability to shop around becomes restricted. Even though there may be contestability 
in the original design/development stage, bi-lateral monopoly arrangements emerge. 
Ex-ante Indicators 









    Cost Overruns 
    Disputes 
    Renegotiations 
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The DoD system program office’s functions/activities related to monitoring, 
controlling, information-gathering, reporting, decision reviews, enforcement, etc., 
tend to grow as oversight/governance increases with anticipated scale and risk of 
investments. Though program cost data may exist, it does not tell us the whole story 
on transaction costs. 
Ideally, we would want to uncover the total program costs and subtract the 
cost of the contract. The difference consists of transaction costs (whose main 
components are coordination and motivation costs). This approach would capture 
the usual coordination costs and also any extra-normal costs that can arise as a 
result of hold-up and other motivation cost issues related to incomplete contracts 
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Measuring Transaction Costs in DoD Programs  
Based on the indicators shown in Figure 1, our research methodology unfolds 
in two parts: i) for Indicators of High Transactions Costs, we apply the Powell (2002) 
stoplight scheme (augmented by Frank, 2004), with special emphasis on asset 
specificity, ii) for observable manifestations of cost problems and governance issues 
during the program, we can consult histories of actual programs. 
The “stoplight” method provides an ex-ante assessment of a program by 
examining the following characteristics: 
1)  Asset Specificity 
 GREEN:  Many available suppliers 
 RED: One qualified supplier 
2)  Complexity 
 GREEN:  Routine task or standard product 
 RED:  Large scale, specialized skills 
3)  Length of Relationship 
 GREEN:  Series of separate transactions 
 RED:  Long-term, hard to foresee problems 
4)  Time Sensitivity 
 GREEN:  Non-timely performance causes inconvenience 
 RED:  Timely, short-fused performance highly important 
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 GREEN:  Unsatisfactory performance causes inconvenience 
 RED:  Unsatisfactory performance degrades readiness or safety 
In our previous research, we applied the stoplight scheme to two different 
acquisition projects: The Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System—Medium (AAWS-
M), later to become the Javelin and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).  
The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2.   
TCE Indicator Assessment 
Asset Specificity YELLOW 
Complexity RED 
Length of Relationship YELLOW 
Time Sensitivity YELLOW 
Operational Significance YELLOW 
 
Table 1.  Ex-ante Assessment of Javelin Development Program 
TCE Indicator Assessment 
Asset Specificity RED 
Complexity GREEN 
Length of Relationship GREEN 
Time Sensitivity YELLOW 
Operational Significance YELLOW 
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For this study, we focused on ex-post indicators of transactions costs.  More 
specifically, we examined how transaction costs might be captured in examining the 
outcomes of acquisition programs.   
In order to test our hypothesis that the traditional WBS approach may 
overlook some important variables resulting in unrealistically low initial cost 
estimates, we would have to compare cost estimates for systems that included 
significant transaction costs with those of systems that did not include significant 
transaction costs.  The first problem, then, was to find a way to measure transaction 
costs in acquisition programs.  We initially proposed using the government's 
Program Management Office (PMO) costs as a proxy measure of the amount of 
transaction costs present in an acquisition program. 
We started by examining information from the Consolidated Acquisition 
Reporting System (CARS) to find evidence of transaction costs.  The information is 
contained in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Business Information 
Laboratory (BIL) database managed by OUSD (AT&L) Acquisition Resources and 
Analysis.  It includes information on contract performance and program cost from a 
variety of reports, such as Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summaries (DAES), as well as other reports.  Unfortunately, 
these reports do not contain the level of detail necessary to identify transaction 
costs.  Specifically, there was no information on the amount of resources estimated 
or used for the PMO. 
Instead, we looked at the Budget Item Justification sheets in the OSD budget.  
While there is some information on PMO costs in these documents, it is reported 
inconsistently or not at all (depending on the program and year).  We also noted that 
what is included in PMO costs is not a complete picture of the resources used, since 
military salaries are excluded and civilian salaries may or may not be included 
depending on how they are funded.  More importantly, what is and is not included in 
the category varies over time, making the identification of transaction costs difficult 
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A more significant problem we encountered is that the information reported in 
CARS does not necessarily track to the information reported for the same program 
in the OSD budget.  This problem was confirmed by OUSD (AT&L) Acquisition 
Resources and Analysis and is an issue they have been working on for several 
years. 
Contributing to the difficulty of identifying program transaction costs is the fact 
that program managers only report information on a program's major contracts for 
RDT&E, procurement, military construction, and acquisition-related operation and 
maintenance.  According to the CARS Users’ Guide, SAR Section 15 (Contract 
Information) only includes the six largest, currently active contracts (excludes 
subcontracts) that exceed $40 million in then-year dollars.  For a given reporting 
quarter, these are generally the same contracts reporting in Section 6 (Program 
Background Data) of the DAES.  If a previously reported contract is over 90% 
complete, it will no longer be reported.  So, tracking Budget at Completion (BAC) 
and Estimate at Completion (EAC) at the program level involves moving targets as 
the individual contracts are completed and drop out of the CARS.  Also, the total 
amount shown for the program in the OSD budget may include other contracts not 
reported in CARS.  These issues suggest that the cost data currently collected for 
major weapon systems is not well suited for developing a cost model that includes 
transaction cost variables.   
Due to the difficulties noted above, instead of looking at the government 
program management office (buyer) costs, we decided to look at the contractor’s 
program management (seller) costs as a proxy for transactions costs.  This effort 
proved to be more successful although extremely time consuming.  The source 
documents for contractor cost are the Cost Data Summary Reports (CDSRs) (DD 
form 1921).  While there are inconsistencies in reporting program management 
costs from contract to contract and contractor to contractor, the category itself is 
reported for every contract, and because it is based on the WBS, the reporting 
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management costs in somewhat different ways.  For example, some contractors 
separate program management into Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) and non-ILS.  
Some report System Engineering and Program Management as two separate 
categories, while others report them in one category—Systems 
Engineering/Program Management (SEPM).  These inconsistencies make it difficult 
but not impossible to compare program management costs across programs.   
For this study we used SEPM as the proxy for transactions costs.  It is worth 
noting that Systems Engineering might be more indicative of complexity problems 
associated with transactions costs, while Program Management might be more 
indicative of the broader category of coordination costs.  Unfortunately, it is not 
always possible to separate the data into these two categories. 
A ratio of SEPM costs to total program cost (per the CDSRs) was calculated 
for each program. The hypothesis is that a higher ratio could be an ex-post indicator 
of higher transactions costs.  To offer a preliminary test of this hypothesis, we 
developed two case studies (Javelin and ATACMS)1. 
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Preliminary Results 
Our initial effort focused on the SEPM costs associated with the two 
previously assessed cases: the Javelin and ATACMS.  One of the authors was 
fortunate to have served as the Assistant Project Manager for Research & 
Development for each of the programs and was thus well qualified to examine 
transaction cost indicators for the two programs.  Based on the ex-ante indicators 
assessed with the stoplight method (shown in Tables 1 and 2) along with direct 
assessment by the authors, it was clear that the Javelin exhibited more 
characteristics associated with high transactions costs than ATACMS. 
The research question was whether the ex-post indicator (the SEPM ratio) 
would be higher for the Javelin than ATACMS. Several ex-post indicators suggested 
transaction costs might be higher for the Javelin when compared to ATACMS.  One 
was the number of CDSRs filed for each program that reflects “complexity,” namely 
the number of contracts required to develop and procure the weapon system.  There 
were 20 filed for Javelin and only 9 filed for ATACMS.  This was not unexpected, as 
there were up to three separate sources for the initial Javelin development, while 
only one source was used for the ATACMS.  Clearly, higher transaction costs could 
be expected for the Javelin. 
Another ex-post indicator was the type of contracts used for the programs.  
The Javelin used mostly Cost Plus contracts, indicating that the parties anticipated 
more uncertainty (risk) in the transactions.  The ATACMS on the other hand used 
mostly Firm Fixed Price contracts, typical for lower risk and better defined 
transactions. 
As expected, the SEPM indicator for the Javelin was higher than for the 
ATACMS.  The Javelin had an SEPM ratio of .1629 while the ATACMS ratio was 
.0858.  This supports the hypothesis that programs with more complex, risky 
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costs as evidenced by the ex-post SEPM ratio indicator.  What is not clear at this 
point is whether the SEPM ratio reflects management’s efforts to control those 
transaction costs or if they are merely caused by the riskier relationships. 
Further Research 
We have begun to look at SEPM ratio for a data set of major acquisition 
programs.  We plan to see if there is a relationship between the SEPM ratio and the 
number of cost and schedule breaches experienced by a program as illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3.  This would test the hypothesis that programs with riskier 
relationships have higher transactions costs and will experience more cost and 
schedule overruns. In turn, this could lead to ex-ante understanding of efforts 
needed to guide contractual types and other governance mechanisms to minimize 
transaction costs. 
 
Figure 2.  RDT&E cost breaches vs. SEPM ratio 
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Figure 3.  Procurement cost breaches vs. SEPM ratio 
In the above graphs, cost breaches are defined as follows: 
 RDT&E Breach:  When the program’s research, development, test 
and evaluation costs exceed 15% of the baseline threshold. 
 APUC Breach:  When the average procurement unit cost exceeds the 
most recent APB threshold by 15%.  This is a congressionally 
reportable breach2. 
We also plan to develop more case studies to examine ex-ante and ex-post 
indicators of transaction costs.  To further explain the relationship between 
transaction costs and total acquisition costs, more standardized transaction cost 
indicators are needed.  Specifically, information on cost avoidance measures, 
contract negotiation and adjudication, tapered integration and monitoring efforts 
should be examined and documented to facilitate research aimed at integrating 
transaction costs into DoD cost estimates. 
                                            
2 Since the law was enacted in 1982, Title 10 USC Section 2433, a “Nunn-McCurdy” unit cost breach 
occurs when a major defense acquisition program experiences an increase of at least 15% in 
program acquisition unit cost or average procurement unit cost above the unit costs in the acquisition 
program baseline. 
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